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ABSTRACT
In the last four years, daily deals have emerged from nowhere
to become a multi-billion dollar industry world-wide. Daily
deal sites such as Groupon and Livingsocial offer products
and services at deep discounts to consumers via email and
social networks. As the industry matures, there are many
questions regarding the impact of daily deals on the mar-
ketplace. Important questions in this regard concern the
reasons why businesses decide to offer daily deals and their
longer-term impact on businesses. In the present paper, we
investigate whether the unobserved factors that make mar-
keters run daily deals are correlated with the unobserved
factors that influence the business, In particular, we employ
the framework of seemingly unrelated regression to model
the correlation between the errors in predicting whether a
business uses a daily deal and the errors in predicting the
business’ survival. Our analysis consists of the survival of
985 small businesses that offered daily deals between Jan-
uary and July 2011 in the city of Chicago. Our results
indicate that there is a statistically significant correlation
between the unobserved factors that influence the business’
decision to offer a daily deal and the unobserved factors that
impact its survival. Furthermore, our results indicate that
the correlation coefficient is significant in certain business
categories (e.g. restaurants).
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.8 [Computational Advertising]: Economics of Daily
Deals
Keywords
Daily deals, Consumer ratings, Seemingly unrelated regres-
sion
1. INTRODUCTION
Daily deal sites such as Groupon represent a novel ap-
proach to Internet marketing that tap into local markets,
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and based on the massive scale and rapid growth of such
sites, the business model has gained rapid adoption from a
wide range of businesses.
Despite this success, a vocal contrarian view of the daily
deals model has emerged. Its chief criticism is probably
skepticism about the value of daily deals to the merchants
whose goods and services are promoted. To be sure, enthu-
siastic advocates are easy to find; Groupon has claimed that
97% [11] of businesses using its service want to be featured
again. But an independent study estimates repeat intent at
only 48.1%. Some anecdotal reports are surprisingly harsh,
including a highly publicized blog posting by the owner of
a New York bakery cafe, who described her Groupon pro-
motion as ”the single worst decision I have ever made as a
business owner”.
The diverging views about the profitability and long term
impact of the multi-billion daily deals industry calls for a
thorough study and more details than previous attempts.
Any study pertaining to evaluate the impact of daily deals
on key business metrics needs to isolate the causal impact
of daily deals from other factors that might be correlated
with daily deal adoption and also impact business metrics.
In this paper, we examine the impact of daily deals on
the business from the lens of modern econometrics. It is
well known that the gold standard for evaluating a treat-
ment effect such as daily deals is through randomized ex-
periments. In practice however, it is not possible to run the
experiments needed to isolate the impact of daily deals from
other confounding factors. Therefore, most studies including
ours will have to contend with observational data. Working
with observational data poses its own set of challenges and
it is exactly these challenges that call for tools from modern
econometrics.
One of the main challenges of working with observational
data is unobserved heterogeneity. While two businesses might
look identical along the observed dimensions such as cate-
gory, location..etc, they may differ along dimensions that
can have a significant impact on the business. For exam-
ple, a struggling business with a high staff turnover will be
more likely to fail than a similar business. Also, struggling
businesses might be more tempted to use a daily deal to
help shore sales. A naive application of standard statisti-
cal techniques will show daily deal adoption to be a factor
in business failure while in reality it is staff turnover that
contributed to the failure. To alleviate the problems of un-
observed heterogeneity, we treat the daily deal adoption as
a dependent variable. A business’s decision to adopt a daily
deal will depend on a number of observed independent vari-
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ables such as the business category, how popular are deals in
category, etc. The daily deal decision will also be impacted
by unobserved factors. Similarly, business failure will de-
pend on observed dependent variables and unobserved fac-
tors. For example, consider a business that runs a daily deal
despite of having no apparent reason to do so. Does that
signal anything about the unobserved reasons that might
lead the business to fail down the line? If the unobserved
factors that make a business run a daily deal are correlated
with the unobserved factors that lead to business failure then
indeed the daily deal adoption conveys additional informa-
tion about the business and should be taken into account.
On the other hand, if there is no correlation between the
unobserved factors in daily deal and failure, then knowing
whether a business offered a daily deal does not convey ad-
ditional information.
We resort to techniques from modern econometrics to help
test whether the unobserved factors in daily deal adoption
and failure are correlated. In particular, we use the frame-
work of multiple equation models. One equation in our set-
ting models the business’s decision to offer a daily deal and
the second equation models the business failure. In order
to model both equations, we need to identify the dependent
variables (daily deal adoption and failure) and a set of co-
variates that best describe each model.
In this work, we tried to insure that our results were statis-
tically significant, robust to modeling assumptions and scal-
able. To help achieve statistical significance, we compiled a
large data set that had information on daily deal adoption,
business failure and information about the businesses. To
test robustness of our models, we used two frameworks that
make different modeling assumptions. To insure scalability,
we developed a data driven approach that does not require
expensive interviews with customers or lab experiments. In
particular, we crawled Yelp to get information about the
business and whether a business was closed. For daily deal
adoption, we used a data set from [14].
In this paper we develop a model for business failure in
Chicago where both the failure data and business informa-
tion are derived from Yelp. We also develop a separate
model for daily deal adoption where we join the data set
from [14] with Yelp data. We decided to use Chicago because
in addition to being the third largest city in the U.S, it is
the home town of the largest daily deal provider “Groupon”
and had a large number of business adopting daily deals. We
then developed joint models of daily deal adoption and busi-
ness failure. Our results show that a joint model of business
failure and daily deal adoption does a better job in explain-
ing the data than the two separate models. We tested the
robustness of our results by specifying two different model-
ing paradigms with different model assumption ; bivariate
probit and seemingly unrelated regression.
Our results show that models of business failure and daily
deals adoption using Yelp based features provide good per-
formance. Furthermore, we find a positive and statistically
significant correlation between the unobserved factors that
make a business offer a daily deal and the unobserved fac-
tors that contribute to failure. Our results indicate that the
correlation is strongest in case of Restaurants 0.281 and
smaller in case of Spas 0.24. These results are consistent
with results of Gupta [11] that found that deals are gener-
ally good for Spas and bad for Restaurants.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are the
following:
• We conducted a data driven large scale study to test
and quantify whether the unobserved factors that make
a business decide to make daily deals are correlated to
the unobserved factors that impact the business sur-
vival.
• We developed and analyzed business survival and daily
deal adoptions models based on business features col-
lected from Yelp.
• We conducted statistical tests and two different econo-
metrics frameworks to insure statistical significance of
results.
• Our results are consistent with findings from previous
research work that used labor intensive surveys.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey
related work. In Section 3, we describe our data and the
methods employed to collect it. In Section 4, we describe
the necessary background from econometrics that is needed
to develop our models. In Section 5, we describe our ex-
periments, results and evaluations. Finally, in Section 6 we
summarize our findings and give directions for future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Recently, there has been an increasing number of both
empirical and theoretical research on daily deals or what is
sometimes called voucher discounting. Most of this work
focused on studying Groupon and LivingSocial discounted
deals. For example, Dholakia studied the question of whether
Groupon promotions are profitable for businesses and which
businesses fare the best and worst after offering a Groupon
promotion [7, 8]. He found mixed results where some busi-
ness owners reported their Groupon promotion was prof-
itable and others regretted making the promotion based on
their experience of lower spending and return rates from
Groupon users. In another study, Arabshahi provided a de-
tailed analysis that explains the Groupon business model
and its underlying principles [3]. In his paper, he explained
that the main challenge facing merchants lies in identifying
price-sensitive potential customers and offering them dis-
counts. Therefore, Groupon can help merchants to apply
price discrimination through the ”highly discounted deals”
provided to a massive scale of price-sensitive subscribers. In
a similar work, Edelman et al. provided a theoretical study
of the economics of Groupon deals from the perspective of
participating merchants rather than from the perspective
of the deal service provider [9]. Their results indicate that
voucher discounts are naturally good fits for certain types
of merchants, and poor fits for others.
Similarly, Gupta et al. [11] investigated when are daily
deals profitable for business by interviewing over 2000 busi-
ness that offered daily deal through “Groupon”. They found
that the success of a daily deal is far from certain and that
the return on investment varies widely. They identified the
types of businesses as a reliable predictor of profitability and
that daily deals are good for spas but bad for restaurants.
The work presented in [7, 8] and [11] can be viewed as
complementary to our work; while we focused on a data
driven scalable approach, [7, 8] and [11] focused on a more
labor intensive interview process. These two approaches are
not exclusive with the findings from one guiding the other.
Business Category Total No. Multiple Deals (%) Closed (%)
Restaurants & Bars 337 7.1 8.3
Beauty & Spas 189 10 4.7
Active Life 151 9.2 1.9
Shopping 116 6.4 0.9
Fitness & Instruction 87 5.3 0.0
Food 84 7.1 11.9
Health & Medical 77 12.1 0.0
Nightlife 73 5.5 1.4
Hair Salons 73 9 6.5
Arts & Entertainment 72 6.8 1.4
Table 1: Statistics of Groupon Businesses in Chicago (Jan-July 2011)
Also, Ye et al. studied the group purchasing behavior of
daily deals in Groupon and LivingSocial and they proposed
a predictive dynamic model for group buying behavior [20].
Their model was able to predict the popularity of group
deals as function of time. They also found that the different
incentive mechanisms applied in Groupon and Living Social
(individual threshold versus collective threshold) lead to dif-
ferent propagation behavior, which finally lead to different
predictability.
While studying daily deals is interesting in itself, another
trend of research started to study the marriage between daily
deal sites and the growing consumer phenomena such as
Yelp. Byers et al. initiated the study of how daily deal
sites affect the reputation of the business and in particular
the business Yelp reviews [5]. In their first research paper,
the authors studied the interplay between social networks
and daily deal sites. They found that daily deal sites benefit
from significant word-of-mouth effects during sales events.
They also studied the effects of daily deals on the long-term
reputation of merchants, based on their Yelp reviews before
and after they run a daily deal. They found that the Yelp
ratings of Groupon-bearing consumers were on average 10%
lower than those of their peers.
In another study, Byers et al. rigorously evaluated var-
ious hypotheses about underlying consumer and merchant
behavior to understand the Groupon effect on businesses
[6]. They examined a number of hypotheses to justify the
Groupon effect. For example, they illustrated a poor busi-
ness behavior, and Groupon user experimentation to be pos-
sible root causes of the Groupon effect. They also found an
evidence that on average Groupon users are no more critical
than their peers.
Similarly, Zervas tried to establish basic facts regarding
the evolving quality of the deals that Groupon offers [22].
He used Yelp ratings as a proxy for measuring the quality.
Using simple regression analyses, Zervas found a statistically
significant negative correlation between the time deals that
have been offered and the Yelp ratings of the merchants
who offered them. Further, he discussed some possibilities
that might cause these trends. For example, as Groupon
is expanding the number of deals it offers, it has to work
with some lower-rated merchants. Also, it is possible that
better-rated merchants dropping out of running Groupon
deals, and Groupon has to substitute them for merchants
with some lower-rated merchants.
Our work builds on [6] and [22] by explicitly modeling the
decision to offer a daily deal and leveraging the error in the
model to explain part of the unobserved factors in modeling
business performance.
Business reviews collected from Yelp have also been stud-
ied by Luca [16]. Luca evaluated the impact of Yelp reviews
on restaurant’s quarterly earnings in Seattle using the frame-
work of regression discontinuity. Luca finds that the ob-
served response to Yelp rating are consistent with bayesian
learning. Under the bayesian hypothesis, reactions to signals
are stronger when the signal is more precise (i.e., the Yelp
average rating contains more information when the number
of reviews is high). Moe precisely, a change in a restaurant’s
average rating has 50% more impact when the restaurant
has at least 50 reviews (compared to a restaurant with fewer
than 10 reviews).
Luca [16] also tests whether restaurants are gaming the
rating system using the McCrary [17] test. The intuition of
the test is as follows. Suppose that restaurants were gam-
ing Yelp in a way that would bias the results. Then, one
would expect to see a disproportionately large number of
restaurants just above the rounding thresholds. Luca [16]
finds that this is not the case. The results presented in [16]
are related to our work in two ways. First, we use the con-
cept of “Bayesian Learning” to derive statistically significant
predictors of both daily deal adoption and business failure.
Second, the McCrary test [17] suggests that the reviews on
Yelp truly reflect the opinion of the Yelp community and are
not being manipulated by the businesses on Yelp.
Pindyck and Rubinfeld [18] model the relation between
private school attendance and voting for property tax in-
creases that are used in part to finance public schools. In
this application, the variables are whether children attend
private school, number of years the family has been at the
present residence , log of property tax , log of income and
whether the head of the household voted for an increase in
property taxes. Pindyck and Rubinfeld [18] wanted to test
the hypothesis that parents of children who attended private
school will have no incentive from an increase in property
taxes that finance public schools and will vote against any
such increases. Pindyck and Rubinfeld [18] model the bivari-
ate outcomes of whether children attend private school and
whether the head of the household voted for other covari-
ates. They conclude that the two outcomes are independent
and that the voting patterns of parents of children attend-
ing private schools do not differ from parents of children
attending public schools. Our work is related to [18] in that
we test for the independence of two binary outcomes; daily
deal adoption and business failure.
3. DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
Our dataset collection has two major components. First,
Business Category Total No. Closed (%)
Restaurants & Bars 8490 17.7
Shopping 4961 10.6
Food 3259 14.9
Beauty & Spas 2692 5.9
Health & Medical 2666 2.14
Nightlife 1851 16.0
Active Life 1301 6.3
Arts & Entertainment 1267 6.0
Hair Salons 948 5.3
Fitness & Instruction 740 7.6
Table 2: Statistics of Yelp Businesses in Chicago as
of July 2012
we collected data from Groupon as one of the top deal sites
that offers daily deals in Chicago. Second, we collected data
from Yelp for all the businesses in Chicago.
Groupon Data.
We used the Groupon data set compiled by Byers et al.
[5] which includes the web links of 16, 692 deals offered by
Groupon in 20 U.S. cities between January and July 2011.
In this paper we focus only on the subset of Groupon deals
offered in Chicago. We selected Chicago not just because it
is the third largest city in U.S but also it the home town of
Groupon. When the Groupon business is featured on Yelp,
Groupon occasionally uses that information to promote the
deal by including a link to the Yelp site as well as other
information (e.g. star rating and selected customer reviews).
However, in some cases Groupon does not mention the Yelp
link on the deal page even if the business has a Yelp link.
We are interested in Yelp since it provides a wide range
of information about the business. For Example, Yelp pro-
vides business location, number of reviews, date of review,
star ratings, review text and other features such as alcohol
license and price range. Moreover, Yelp indicates whether
the business is still in operation or whether the business has
closed by adding the string ”CLOSED” next to the business
name. Previous research has shown the potential of Yelp
to indicate business parameters and performance [16] as we
explained in section 2.
Groupon provides a convenient API 1 to collect informa-
tion about the deals, however, we decided to develop our
web crawler to extract features that are not supported by
the API. For example, whether there is a link to Yelp or not.
We initially had 1861 Groupon deals from chicago, with ap-
proximately 60% of them had their Yelp links listed. For the
deals without Yelp links, we used the Yelp search feature to
find a match for the Groupon business on Yelp. Specifically,
we searched Yelp by the business name and the zip code
listed on the deal webpage. Typically, Yelp return search
results for relevant matches within the given zip code and
other nearby zip codes. However, we report only the query
results that exactly matched both the business name and
its zip code. By the end of this matching process, we suc-
cessfully associated 1184 Groupon deals with Yelp links, we
call them ”GrouponDealsWithYelp”. We also observed that
some businesses offered multiple deals while others offered
only one deal. While these deals are supposed to be all in
Chicago, we found few cases where the deal zip code was
outside Chicago (for other branches of the business in other
states). Since we focus only on Chicago business we decided
1http://www.groupon.com/pages/api
to filter these cases. Finally, we developed our web crawler
to extract the Yelp information for the businesses in the
set ”GrouponDealsWithYelp”. After filtering the businesses
that had zero reviews (since they don’t provide any informa-
tion about the business), we observed 985 businesses with
Groupon deals and Yelp links. We call this set Groupon-
Business”. Table 1 provides statistics of the set ”Groupon-
Business” for the top 10 business categories.
Yelp Data.
We crawled the Yelp site to collect all the businesses that
appear in Chicago (regardless whether they offer a deal or
not). Yelp uses a structured format that arranges business
names by alphabetical order. We initially had 38, 000 busi-
nesses listed in Yelp. After filtering all the cases that have
zero reviews, we had 32, 424 with approximately 9% failed
businesses (closed) and approximately 4% offered Groupon
between January and July 2011. We refer to this set as our
Yelp Population to represent the real population of busi-
nesses in Chicago. However, we expect Yelp data would
represent certain business categories (e.g. restaurants) more
than others (e.g. Insurance). Therefore, we decided to ana-
lyze only the top business categories. In Table 2 we provide
statistics of the dataset we collected from Yelp for the top
10 business categories.
In the next sections, We proceeded to build a model for
predicting failure using Yelp data. The details of the model
are shown in Section 5.2. To build the bivariate model of
Groupon adoption and business failure, we had to restrict
our analysis to the businesses that did not offer a Groupon
but were operating during the same period as the ”Groupon-
Business”. We use the date of the last review posted for the
business as a proxy for the closing date. We refer to the set
that includes all of the businesses that did not offer Groupon
deals and did not fail before January 2011 as ”nonGroupon-
Business”.
Analysis.
Table 1 provides statistics of the set ”GrouponBusiness”
for the top 10 business categories. Also, Table 2 provides
statistics of our data Yelp Population which includes both
the two sets ”GrouponBusiness” and ”nonGrouponBusiness”.
From Table 1 and Table 2, we observe some interesting pat-
terns. First, we observe a difference in the ranks of the
business categories between the total population of Yelp
data and the ”GrouponBusiness”except for the first category
”Restaurants & Bars”. We conjecture that some business
categories could be popular on Yelp but they don’t have the
incentives to offer daily deals. We also observe that the high-
est percentage of closed businesses comes from the categories
”Restaurants & Bars”, ”Food”, and ”Nightlife”. In addition,
we observed that some business in the set ”GrouponBusi-
ness” had the incentives to offer multiple daily deals during
the six month period we analyzed.
As we discussed in section 2, previous research work em-
phasized the potential of Yelp as a proxy measure for busi-
ness key performance indicators (e.g. survival, consumer
appeal, and revenue) [16, 5, 6, 22]. Luca in [16] found
that 69% of restaurants in Seattle are listed on Yelp. Also,
Luca showed that changes in Yelp ratings are associated
with changes in revenues [16]. These studies indicate the
potential of Yelp data as representative of the true pop-
ulation. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of
this research analyzed Yelp as a source of business failure
information. Therefore, to test the representativeness of
Yelp data as a source of business failure information, we
compared the number of closed businesses collected from
Yelp to the number of bankrupted businesses as reported by
bankruptcy filings of the Northern Illinois (which includes
Chicago) open court records collected by the bankruptcy
data project at Harvard 2. Both the data from Yelp and
court bankruptcy filings are between January 2006 and July
2012. Figure 1 shows the plot of the two normalized time
series data . As shown in the plot, there is a strong correla-
tion between the number of closed businesses computed from
Yelp and the number of bankrupted businesses (correlation
coeff. = 0.7164). Also, the two datasets have a similar trend
as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Normalized Yelp Closed Businesses ver-
sus Normalized Bankrupted Businesses between Jan
2006 and July 2012
4. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
In this section, we develop the econometric model. To
motivate the need for an econometric model, consider the
task of deciding whether running a daily deal increases the
risk of business failure. We can model this as a regression
problem of the form
failurei = β ∗ dailydeali + ei (1)
where ”failurei” is whether business ”i” fails, , ”dailydeali”
indicates whether the business ran a daily deal and ei is the
error term and captures all the factors that are not included
in the model. These factors are referred to as the ”unob-
served heterogeneity”. The unobserved heterogeneity can
include factors such as location specific risk, category risk
.. .etc. It can also include factors that are correlated with
the business decision to run a daily deal such as whether
the business is struggling. Consider for example the class of
struggling businesses that use daily deals as a last resort to
attract more customers. In expectation, a struggling busi-
ness will have a higher risk of failure. However, if we were
to perform a regression analysis using Equation 1, we will
over estimate the impact of daily deals (β) because a large
number of the struggling businesses that used daily deals
failed. While in fact, these businesses did not fail because
of daily deals, they failed because of internal problems that
happened to be correlated with the decision to offer a daily
2http://bdp.law.harvard.edu
deal. In this case, we have an omitted variable bias [10]. The
omitted variable bias will only arise however, if the omitted
variable (which in our case is whether the business was strug-
gling), is correlated with one of the regressors ( the decision
to use daily deal).
The problem can also be viewed from the lens of endo-
geneity. A perquisite to any regression model is that the re-
gressors are exogenous, [10] i.e., the regressor variable comes
from outside of the model and cannot be explained by any of
the variables of the model. However, as we have seen in the
above example, the regressor dailydeal was correlated with
the errors. Consequently, the variable dailydeal is not ex-
ogenous as it it can be explained in part by the errors. The
omitted variable bias is a form of endogeneity that results
in a biased estimator.
If we wanted to estimate the impact of daily deals on
the business survival, we will need to find an instrument
[10]. An instrument is a variable that is correlated with the
endogenous variable (dailydeal) but is not correlated with
error (struggling business). For example, we could use the
size of the daily deals providers sales force as an instrument
since it is likely to be correlated with decision to adopt daily
deals but unlikely to be correlated with the error term. A
model with an instrumental variable is estimated using 2
stage least squares (2sls). In future work, we will address
the use of instrumental variables approach.
However, in this paper, we don’t directly attempt to model
the impact of the daily deal on business survival. Instead,
we focus on assessing the correlation between the unobserved
factors that make a business offer a daily deal and the un-
observed factors that influence failure. In that vein, we con-
sider two different econometric models. In section 4.1, we
use a bivariate probit model to check whether the errors in
predicting if the business decision to run a daily deal are
correlated with the errors in predicting the business failure.
Since the errors model the unobserved heterogeneity, the
bivariate model will help identify whether the unobserved
factors that make a business run a daily deal are also cor-
related with the unobserved factors that contribute to the
business failure. In section 4.2, we relax the conditions that
the dependent variables (run a daily deal and failure) are
binary and use the framework of seemingly unrelated re-
gression ” (SURE) to answer the same question addressed
by the bivariate profit.
Our decision to use the SURE model is motivated by two
factors. First, the bivariate probit model makes the explicit
assumption that the error terms are jointly normal. While
this might sound like a reasonable assumption, we have no
way of checking its validity. On the other other hand, the
SURE model does not make any assumptions about the joint
distributions of the error, but rather uses the variance of
these distributions to derive its estimate. Therefore, the
use of two models provides us with a robustness test as in
[19]. The second reason we consider the SURE model is that
recent developments in econometrics [2] that used actual ex-
perimental data do not show any advantages of enforcing the
limited range of dependent variables.
An important question is whether a single model best ex-
plains the two dependent outcomes (daily deals adoption
and survival ) or whether we need two separate models. In
section 4.3, we describe a specification test based on the
likelihood of the data and show how they relate to paramet-
ric technique, that test the null hypothesis of no correlation
between the error terms.
4.1 Bivariate Probit
Assume that we have a random sample of N observations
where each observation is donated by i such that i = 1, ..., N .
In ordinary regression models, we typically observe only one
dependent variable for each observation Y = (Y1, ..., YN ).
However, in the general case general case, we can observe
multiple dependent variables for each observation. Let Yji
denote the response of the ith observational unit for the jth
dependent variable. A typical situation is the case when we
observe 2 variables, such that Y1i and Y2i are two binary
dependent variables.
Traditional probit models can generally be described as la-
tent variable models, in which we define a latent variable Y ∗
such that Y = 1(Y ∗>0). In this section, we consider the bi-
variate probit model. The bivariate probit model belongs to
the generalized class that is usually used to estimate several
correlated binary variables jointly. These often represent
two interrelated decisions, for example, to adopt two differ-
ent, but related, policy initiatives. In the bivariate probit
model, we have two separate probit models with correlated
error terms. Specifically, we have two binary dependent vari-
ables for each ith observational unit : Yji = Y1i, Y2i such that
j = 1, 2. Therefore, we have the following model
Y ∗1i = X1iβ1 + ε1i (2)
Y ∗2i = X2iβ2 + ε2i (3)
where Y ∗1i and Y
∗
2i are the latent variables and they are re-
lated to the dependent variables by the following equation
Y1i = 1(Y ∗1i>0) (4)
Y2i = 1(Y ∗2i>0) (5)
The vectors X1i denotes the [N1 × 1] vector of exogenous
regressor for dependent variable ”1” . X2i denotes the [N2×
1] vector of exogenous regressor for dependent variable ”2”
. In the bivariate probit model, the main assumption is
that error terms ε1i, ε2i are independent across observations
“i” but may have cross-equation correlations. Therefore, we
have E[εjiεjk|x] = 0 ∀i 6= k. In addition, the error terms
are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution [10](
ε1i
ε2i
)
|X ∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
))
(6)
Where ρ is a correlation parameter denoting the extent to
which the two ε’s covary. The conditional expectation for
the bivariate normal distribution is given by
E(ε2i|ε1i > z) = ρ φ1(z)
Φ1(−z) (7)
where Φ1, φ1 are the univariate normal cumulative distri-
bution and density functions respectively.Equation 7 is the
Inverse Mills ratio and has been used extensively in econo-
metrics , [13] [10]. Equation 7 shows that the in case of bi-
variate probit, the errors are not independent, for example
the error in estimating the probability of offering a Groupon
deal corresponds in expectation to a large error in estimat-
ing the probability of business failures. The errors typically
correspond to unobserved variables and by implication the
Inverse Mills ratio indicates that these two variables move in
synchronization. Fitting the bivariate probit model involves
estimating the values of the parameters β1, β2, and ρ. We
use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the param-
eters. The likelihood function L is defined as:
L =
∏
i∈N
P (Y1i = 1, Y2i = 1)
Y1iY2i
P (Y1i = 0, Y2i = 1)
(1−Y1i)Y2i
P (Y1i = 1, Y2i = 0)
Y1i(1−Y2i)
P (Y1i = 0, Y2i = 0)
(1−Y1i)(1−Y2i) (8)
Substituting the latent variables Y ∗1 and Y
∗
2 in the Proba-
bility functions and taking the logarithm gives the log like-
lihood function LL:
LL =
∑
i∈N
Y1iY2i lnP (ε1i > −X1iβ1, ε2i > −X2iβ2)
+(1− Y1i)Y2i lnP (ε1i < −X1iβ1, ε2i > −X2iβ2)
+Y1i(1− Y2i) lnP (ε1i > −X1iβ1, ε2i < −X2iβ2)
+(1− Y1i)(1− Y2i) lnP (ε1i < −X1iβ1, ε2i < −X2iβ2)
(9)
After rearranging the terms, the log-likelihood function be-
comes:
LL = =
∑
i∈N
Y1iY2i ln Φ(X1iβ1, X2iβ2, ρ)
+(1− Y1i)Y2 ln Φ(−X1iβ1, X2iβ2,−ρ)
+Y1i(1− Y2i) ln Φ(X1iβ1,−X2iβ2,−ρ)
+(1− Y1i)(1− Y2i) ln Φ(−X1iβ1,−X2iβ2, ρ)
(10)
Note that Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the
multivariate normal distribution|bivariate normal distribu-
tion and φ is the corresponding density function. Y1i and
Y2i in the log-likelihood function are observed variables be-
ing equal to one or zero.
4.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression
In the previous section, we enforced the constraint that
the dependent variable have a limited range limited depen-
dent variables. The bivariate probit frameworks explicitly
uses bivariate normal distribution to model the joint distri-
bution of the error terms. To test whether this assumption
is indeed valid, we relax these constraints and use the frame-
work of seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) proposed by
Zellner [21]. Furthermore, there is mounting evidence in the
econometrics literature [2] that argues in favor of using Ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) even when the dependent variables
are binary.
Y1i = X1iβ1 + ε1i (11)
Y2i = X2iβ2 + ε2i (12)
As before, the assumption of the model is that error terms
ε1i, ε2i are independent across observations ”i” but may have
cross-equation correlations. Therefore we have E[εjiεjk|x] =
0 ∀i 6= k and(
ε1i
ε2i
)
|X ∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ11
2 ρσ11σ22
ρσ11σ22 σ22
2
))
(13)

y11
y12
...
y1N
y21
y22
...
y2N

=

X11 0
X12 0
...
...
X1N 0
0 X21
0 X22
...
...
0 X2N

(
β1
β2
)
+

ε11
ε12
...
ε1N
ε21
ε22
...
ε2N

(14)
Or in a more compact notation Y = Xβ + ε, E[ε|X] =
0, Var[ε|X] = Ω.
The SURE regression differs from the OLS in that the
covariance matrix is not spherical i.e., Var[ε|X] 6= σ2In
where IN is the identity matrix. In ordinary least squares,
the Best Linear unbiased estimator for the parameters β
is given by β̂OLS = (X
′X)−1X ′y. Once we have a non-
spherical covariance matrix OLS is not efficient. To over-
come this restriction, we use feasible generalized least squares
which is a two stage estimator. In the first stage, we run
ordinary least squares estimation assuming that the two
equations are independent. The residuals from the OLS
are used to estimate the elements of the covariance matrix
σˆij =
1
N
εˆi
T εˆj. In the second stage, we run weighted least
squares using the previously estimated covariance matrix.
Feasible generalized least squares method estimates β by
minimizing the squared Mahalanobis length of the residual
vector βˆFGLS = arg min
b
(Y − Xb)′ Ω−1(Y − Xb) (note the
in case of ordinary least squares Ω is diagonal and therefore
βˆOLS = arg min
b
(Y −Xb)′(Y −Xb) ). The explicit form of
the estimator is given by
βˆFGLS = (X
′Ω−1X)−1X ′Ω−1Y. (15)
To test whether the two equations are best modeled using
a SURE or can be modeled using ordinary least squares,
it suffices to test whether the errors ε1t, ε2t are correlated.
The Breusch-Pagan test [4] which is widely used in detecting
heteroskedasticity can be applied.
4.3 Specification Testing
We use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) [10] to test
whether the data is best described by two separate models
or a single joint model. In the case of the bivariate probit
model, the joint model will have one additional parameter
(the correlation coefficient). We therefore compare the log
likelihood of the joint models in Equation 10 to the log like-
lihood of the separate equations and test whether the dif-
ference is greater than “1.0”. In the case of SURE model,
we replace the log likelihood with the the sum of squared
residuals [10]. For the parametric approach, we employ the
Cramer-Rao bound to compute parameter’s mean and vari-
ance from the maximum likelihood estimator [10]. We use
a “t-test” to test whether the parameters including the cor-
relation coefficient ρ are different from “0”. In the SURE
setting, we use the Breusch -Pagan framework to test the
correlation coefficient.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental setup and re-
sults of several regression models both in a univariate frame-
work and a multiple equation framework. In the univariate
framework, we use a probit model to analyze the significance
of the different factors that may impact the business sur-
vival. Similarly, we use a probit model to analyze the sig-
nificance of the different factors that influence the business
decision to make a daily deal in Groupon. In the multiple
equations framework, we use bivariate probit and seemingly
unrelated regression frameworks to jointly model the busi-
ness survival and the business daily deal decision. Here, our
goal is to specifically investigate whether the unobserved
factors that make the business offer a daily deal are corre-
lated with the unobserved factors that impact the business
survival. We conduct several statistical tests to test if the
data is best described by a joint model and whether the cor-
relation between the unobserved factors is significant. Our
results indicate that joint models fit the data better than
single univariate models and there is strong significant cor-
relation for the two business categories restaurants and spas.
5.1 Sampling
When modeling business survival and Groupon decision
we need to take into account the relative frequency of both
events. On one hand, the probability of a business failure in
any given year is fairly low (in order of 8%). On the other
hand, daily deals is a relatively new phenomena which is
still being evaluated, the number of businesses that lever-
age a daily deal are fairly low compared to the businesses
that don’t offer daily deals. In that vein, we are attempting
to model two rare events : daily deal decision and business
failure. Statistical models tend to underestimate the proba-
bility of rare events[10]. Since the vast majority of the busi-
nesses will be non-groupon and non-closed, the model will
assign a large negative constant to the two equations that
model the daily deal and failure models. The large constants
will make the error terms small and can impact the model’s
ability to detect the correlation between the error terms in
the two equations. To address this problem, we first apply
the Bivariate Probit and the SURE to the entire data set.
We then restrict the models such that there is no constant
terms. We find that in the first case (unrestricted full sam-
ple), a positive but not statistically significant correlation
between the error terms. In case of the full sample but no-
constant , we find that there is a strong positive correlation
between the error terms. This confirms our intuition about
the inability of the full data model to capture the two rare
events. Therefore, we randomly sampled from the popu-
lation of ”nonGrouponBusiness” to account for the sparsity
problems and selection biases that can be caused by data
collection.
5.2 Univariate Probit Models
A probit model is a type of regression used to model a
binary dependent variable. Here, we define two binary de-
pendent variables. First, we define the variable isClosed to
represent whether the business has failed (isClosed=1) or the
business is still operating (isClosed=0). Second, we define
the variable isGroupon to represent whether the business has
made at least one daily deal (isGroupon=1) at Groupon or
the business did not make any deals (isGroupon=0). We de-
velop a business survival model and Groupon decision model
to analyze the factors that influence isClosed and isGroupon
respectively.
Business Survival Model.
Symbol Variable Description
isClosed isClosed A binary outcome indicating whether the business failed (isClosed =1) or operating
(isClosed = 0)
isGroupon isGroupon A binary outcome indicating whether the business made a deal (isGroupon =1) or
no deals (isGroupon = 0)
fzrisk Fail Ziprisk The percentage of failed businesses in the same zip code
fprisk Fail Pricerisk The percentage of failed businesses in the same price category
gzrisk Groupon Ziprisk The percentage of businesses that made Groupon deals in the same zip code
gprisk Groupon Pricerisk The percentage of businesses that made Groupon deals in the same price category
rate Rating Average Yelp Rating
nreview Reviews Number of Yelp Reviews
price Price Category {1,2,3,4} From cheap to most expensive
Table 3: Description of Variables
Table 4: Yelp Population Data
Dependent Variable: isClosed AUC = 0.674
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Fail Ziprisk 6.786∗∗ (0.317)
Fail Pricerisk 7.039∗∗ (0.380)
Rating × Reviews -0.003∗∗ (0.000)
Reviews 0.008∗∗ (0.002)
Rating -0.061∗∗ (0.010)
Intercept -2.287∗∗ (0.060)
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 5: Yelp Population Data
Dependent Variable: isGroupon AUC = 0.894
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Groupon Ziprisk 4.521∗∗ (0.136)
Groupon Pricerisk 10.771∗∗ (0.888)
Rating × Reviews -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Reviews 0.006∗∗ (0.001)
Rating 0.057∗∗ (0.021)
Intercept -2.848∗∗ (0.093)
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
We model the business survival variable isClosed as a probit
function of a number of business variables we collected from
Yelp (refer to Table 3 for notations):
isClosed = f(rate×nreview, rate, nreview, fzrisk, fprisk)
(16)
We tried a number of other specifications and selected the
specification of Equation 16 based on the AIC. Table 4 shows
the results of the model trained on Yelp population data we
collected from Chicago. Although the model is simple, it
fits the data well (AUC=0.674) and all the variables are
statistically significant (p− value < 0.01).
We can gain further insight by examining the marginal
contributions of each of the factors to the probability of sur-
vival. Therefore, we make the following observations from
the results:
• When the average Yelp rating is higher, the risk of
failure gets lower. Higher rated business tend to be
more successful.
• When the number of reviews is higher, the risk of fail-
ure increases. A business with high number of reviews
has been around for a longer time and its risk increases
with time.
• When the average Yelp rating weighted by the num-
ber of reviews rate × nreview increases, the risk of
failure gets lower. This is consistent with the theory
of Bayesian learning presented in [16]. This is because
the average Yelp rating weighted by the number of
reviews gives more precise information compared to
rating or number of reviews only.
• The business location makes a difference, some zip
codes are riskier than others. This is consistent with
previous work on restaurant failure by zip code.
• The price risk computed for the business price category
is also significant similar to the zip code risk.
Groupon Adoption Model.
Similar to the survival model, we model the Groupon deci-
sion variable isGroupon as a probit function of a number of
business variables from Yelp (as in Table 3):
isGroupon = f(rate×nreview, rate, nreview, gzrisk, gprisk)
(17)
We selected the specification of Equation 17 based on the
AIC . Table 5 shows the results of the model trained on
Yelp population data from Chicago. The model has a good
accuracy of AUC = 0.894, that shows the ability of the
model to predict whether a business will decide to make
a daily deal based on some business parameters collected
from Yelp. Also, the regressors are statistically significant
(p− value < 0.01). We can gain further insight by examin-
ing the marginal contributions of each of the factors to the
probability of offering a daily deal. Therefore, we make the
following observations from the results:
• When the average Yelp rating is higher, the probability
of daily deal increases. We conjecture that this is due
in part to how daily deal sales force selects the business
to approach.
• When the number of reviews is higher, the probability
of daily deal increases. We conjecture that this is also
due in part to how daily deal sales force selects the
business to approach.
• When the average Yelp rating weighted by the number
of reviews rate×nreview increases, the probability of
daily deal gets lower. This is an indication of a more
successful business that would not need to make a deal
at Groupon, especially that Groupon takes 50% of the
deal revenue [3]. This results is also consistent with
the theory of Bayesian learning presented in [16].
• The business location in terms of zip code makes a
difference, some zip codes are more likely to offer daily
deals. The higher the number of businesses that make
a deal in the same zip code, the higher the chance of a
business to adopt a deal. This is part due to completive
pressure and in part due to how daily deal sales team
targets geographical areas.
• The business price category is also significant as we
mentioned before.
5.3 Joint Model
We jointly modeled the Groupon and failure models using
Equations 17 and 16 using a bivariate probit model. Table 6
shows that the data is best modeled by a bivariate probit
since the log likelihood of the bivariate model differs from
that of the two separate equations by more than ”1.0”. In ad-
dition, Tables 7 and 8 show that for the two largest daily deal
categories, the correlation between the unobserved factors
”ρ” is positive and significant (0.281 in Restaurants/Bars,
0.24 in Beauty/Spas). As a robustness test, we used the
SURE model to compute the correlation between the unob-
served errors and tested its significance using the Breusch-
Pagan test (correlation=0.054 in Restaurants/Bars, 0.060 in
Beauty/Spas). It should be noted that the bivariate probit
model operates in the space of latent variables that can be
in range [−∞, 0] when the dependent variable is ”0” and in
the range of [0,∞] when the dependent variable is ”1”. The
residuals are therefore computed in that space and can as-
sume large values. On the other hand, the SURE model
operates directly in the space of dependent variable that as-
sume range between ”0” and ”1”. Therefore the residuals are
smaller in case of SURE. This explains why the correlation
coefficient in case of bivariate probit differs from that in case
of SURE model.
Previous work has shown that restaurants with their high
marginal cost, low fixed cost and inability to schedule the ar-
rival of daily deal customers [11] are not well suited to daily
deals. On the other hand, Spas with their low marginal cost,
high fixed cost and ability to schedule daily deal customers
are better suited for daily deals. Conversely, a daily deal is
a more desperate measure for a restaurant than a Spa. This
is validated by our results, if a restaurant offers a daily deal
with out having any strong reason to do so, its probability of
failing increases more than a Spa that had some motivation
for offering a daily deal. Similar to what we did in the uni-
variate case, we analyzed the contributions of factors, and
we have the following observations:
• When the ratings weighted by the number of reviews
rate×nreview increases, the risk of failure gets lower.
Also, the probability of offering a daily deal gets lower.
• Unlike the univariate case, the ratings rate is not a sig-
nificant factor. However, the weighted ratings are sig-
nificant. This is consistent with the theory of Bayesian
learning presented in [16].
• As in the univariate case, when the number of reviews
is higher, the risk of failure increases.
Restaurants and Bars
Model Name No. Params AIC
isGroupon+isClosed 10 1976.46
Bivariate Probit 11 1968.33
Beauty and Spas
Model Name No. Params AIC
isGroupon+isClosed 10 1029.97
Bivariate Probit 11 1028.89
Table 6: AIC for univariate versus bivarite probit
We have also tried other business categories, for example,
Health & Medical, Active Life,..etc. However, there was a
lack of significance of correlation between the unobserved
factors for these categories. We conjecture the lack of sig-
nificance is because we did not have enough samples in those
categories. In future work, we aim to extend our study to
daily deal data from Yipit [1] as well as collecting data from
other sources such as city department of revenue to gain a
better access to businesses that are not represented well by
our current data.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we studied whether daily deal adoption sig-
nals additional information about the business. For the two
largest daily deal categories restaurants and spas, we found
that the unobserved factors that contribute to a business
decision to offer a daily are positively correlated with unob-
served factors that contribute to a business failure. Restau-
rants had a higher correlation while spas had a lower cor-
relation. These results indicate that daily deal provide a
strong signal of business survival for restaurants and to a
lesser extent for spas. Our results also show that social me-
dia sites such as Yelp provide a rich set of information that
can be used to model business. In particular, we found that
consistent with Bayesian learning theory, the rating of busi-
ness weighted by the number of reviews provides a statisti-
cally significant predictor of business failure.Ceteris paribus,
a business with a high number of positive reviews has higher
odds of survival.
In future, we plan to extend our work in multiple direc-
tions. The first direction is to consider other business cate-
gories. In this work, we were limited to the daily deal data
from [5]. Second, we plan to consider daily deal providers
other than Groupon. In the case of Groupon, we modeled
the marketers decision to use daily deal as a binary decision.
We also modeled the business failure as a binary decision.
This allowed us to leverage the framework of bivariate probit
to jointly model daily deal and business failure. In the more
general setting, the marketer can choose to offer a daily deal
through a number of providers or not to offer a deal. In
the general case, the marketer’s choice is best modeled as a
multinomial. We plan to investigate techniques from Multi-
level Multiprocess Models (MLMP) [15]. The data needed
to undertake these two directions can be obtained from daily
deal aggregators such as Yipit [1]
We also plan to address the dynamics of Groupon adop-
tion and business failure. In particular, we plan to test
whether daily deal adoption is stationary, whether business
failures are stationary and whether the two time series are
co-integrated [12]. This will allow us to investigate whether
there is a long term equilibrium between daily deal adoption
and business failure.
Table 7: Restaurants and Bars: Bivariate Probit
Bivariate Probit
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : isGroupon
Groupon Pricerisk 13.978∗∗ (2.122)
Groupon Ziprisk 5.715∗∗ (0.535)
Rating × Reviews -0.002∗∗ (0.001)
Reviews 0.010∗∗ (0.002)
Rating 0.180∗ (0.073)
Intercept -3.385∗∗ (0.293)
Equation 2 : isClosed
Fail Ziprisk 8.791∗∗ (1.021)
Fail Pricerisk 12.928∗∗ (3.541)
Rating × Reviews -0.002∗ (0.001)
Reviews 0.007† (0.004)
Rating -0.013 (0.070)
Intercept -4.202∗∗ (0.495)
Equation 3 : Joint
athrho 0.288∗∗ (0.09161)
rho 0.281 (.08440)
SURE: Breusch-Pagan test of independence
Correlation 0.0543∗∗
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 8: Beauty and Spas: Bivariate Probit
Bivariate Probit
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : isGroupon
Groupon Pricerisk 17.203∗∗ (3.326)
Groupon Ziprisk 4.460∗∗ (0.373)
Rating × Reviews -0.004∗∗ (0.001)
Reviews 0.024∗∗ (0.006)
Rating -0.087 (0.059)
Intercept -2.613∗∗ (0.288)
Equation 2 : isClosed
Fail Ziprisk 5.199∗∗ (1.556)
Fail Pricerisk 8.906∗ (4.538)
Rating × Reviews -0.007∗ (0.003)
Reviews 0.026∗∗ (0.010)
Rating 0.103 (0.090)
Intercept -4.201∗∗ (0.719)
Equation 3 : Joint
athrho 0.25† (0.1433)
rho 0.246 (0.1346)
SURE: Breusch-Pagan test of independence
Correlation 0.060∗∗
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Last but not least, we plan to investigate the causal impact
of Groupon on metrics other than business failure. We plan
to investigate the Groupon impact on sales, number of orders
and order size. This will help us better understand how
the daily deals impact revenue: a) do they impact revenue
through a change in the number of orders. or b) do daily
deals have a stronger impact on order size or c) do daily deals
have an impact on both number and size of orders. We will
also look at using instruments [10] to get an estimate of the
casual impact of Groupon. We are investigating Groupon
sales force as a potential instrument.
7. REFERENCES
[1] http://www.yipit.com/.
[2] J. D. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke. Mostly Harmless
Econometrics: An Empiricists Companion. Princeton
University Press, 2008.
[3] A. Arabshahi. Undressing groupon: An analysis of the
groupon business model, 2010.
[4] T. Breusch and A. Pagan. Simple test for
heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation.
Econometrica, 47(5), 1979.
[5] J. Byers, M. Mitzenmacher, and G. Zervas. Daily
deals: Prediction, social diffusion, and reputational
ramifications. In Proceedings of the fifth ACM
international conference on Web search and data
mining, pages 543–552. ACM, 2012.
[6] J. W. Byers, M. Mitzenmacher, and G. Zervas. The
groupon effect on yelp ratings: a root cause analysis.
In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, EC ’12, pages 248–265, New
York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[7] U. Dholakia. How effective are groupon promotions for
businesses? 2010.
[8] U. Dholakia. How businesses fare with daily deals: A
multi-site analysis of groupon, livingsocial, opentable,
travelzoo, and buywithme promotions. 2011.
[9] B. Edelman, S. Jaffe, and S. Kominers. To groupon or
not to groupon: The profitability of deep discounts.
2010.
[10] W. H. Green. Econometric Analysis. Pearson, 6
edition, 2008.
[11] S. Gupta, T. Keinungham, R. Weaver, and
L. Williams. Are daily deals good for merchants?
[12] J. D. Hamilton. Time Series Analysis. Princeton
University Press, 1994.
[13] J. Heckman. Sample selection bias as a specification
error. Econometrica, 47(1):153–162, 1979.
[14] G. Z. John Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher. Daily deals:
Prediction, social diffusion, and reputational
ramifications. In 5th ACM International Conference
on Web Search and Data Mining (WSDM), 5th ACM
International Conference on Web Search and Data
Mining (WSDM).
[15] L. Lillard and L. Waite. Til death do us part: marital
disruption and mortality. The American Journal of
Sociology, 100, 1995.
[16] M. Luca. Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case
of yelp.com. Technical Report 12-016, Harvard
Business School Working Paper, 2011.
[17] J. McCrary. Manipulation of the running variable in
the regression discontinuity design. Journal of
Econometrics, 2008.
[18] R. Pindyck and D. Rubinfeld. Microeconomics.
Prentice Hall, 2008.
[19] K. Tucker and A. Goldfarb. Online display
advertising: Targeting and intrusiveness. Marketing
Science, 30(3):389–404, 2011.
[20] M. Ye, T. Sandholm, C. Wang, C. Aperjis, and B. A.
Huberman. Collective attention and the dynamics of
group deals. In Proceedings of the 21st international
conference companion on World Wide Web, WWW
’12 Companion, pages 1205–1212, New York, NY,
USA, 2012. ACM.
[21] A. Zelner. An efficient method of estimating seemingly
unrelated regression equations and tests for
aggregation bias. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 57:348–368, 1962.
[22] G. Zervas. The evolving quality of groupon deals
(draft). 2012.
